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Like the feuds of similar and often related adjoining communities, 
academic disagreements have a tendency to manifest the ‘narcissism of 
small differences’. Given the indebtedness of so much of my own recent 
work to Pettit’s elaboration of the core republican idea of freedom as 
non-domination,1 that may seem a potential hazard in the present case 
that naturally I wish very much to avoid. Yet, Pettit is fairly ecumenical 
so far as differences over the practical implications of the core normative 
desiderata of a legitimate political system are concerned. He presents his 
institutional recommendations as suggestions indicating how certain 
problems might be addressed, while noting that the details will always 
need to be adjusted to local circumstances (pp. 180-181). However, in 
one respect he suggests there is a big difference in the republican camp. 
He identifies a major divide between those thinkers he aligns with what 
he calls the Rousseauvian and continental tradition of republicanism, on 
the one hand, and those he locates within a putatively distinct Italian-
Atlantic tradition, which he favours, on the other (pp. 11-18). While he 
views the two traditions as sharing the neo-Roman republican conception 
of freedom as non-domination, he regards them as diverging with respect 
to what he considers as the two other ‘core’ ideas of his preferred 
tradition of republican thought: namely, the constraints associated with 
the ‘mixed constitution’ and the importance of a ‘contestatory citizenry’. 
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He sees these last two ideas as linked, the one facilitating and making 
possible the other. By contrast, he regards the Rousseauvian tradition as 
promoting two alternative ideas – that of popular sovereignty and equal 
political participation in popular decision-making – that involve the 
rejection of the corresponding core ideas of this preferred Italian-Atlantic 
tradition. In what follows, I shall suggest these two traditions may be 
more compatible than he suggests, though small differences of emphasis 
may remain of the kind we agree one should not be too narcissistic about. 
To the extent big differences exist, which is no doubt the big difference 
between us, then priority should go to the features he associates with the 
Rousseauvian rather than the Italian-Atlantic tradition.  
The argument I wish to make is analytical rather than historical – 
the contrast between what might be termed a neo-Rousseauvian tradition 
and a neo-Italian-Atlantic tradition, rather than, say, between Rousseau 
and Machiavelli per se. The nub of my case is that the mixed constitution 
and contestation, the second and third of the ideas Pettit identifies as core 
to his preferred republican tradition, have a different theoretical status to 
the first core idea, that of freedom as non-domination. They offer possible 
institutional arrangements that might be needed in certain circumstances 
to realize the main normative criteria regarding a political system that he 
identifies as following from the idea of non-domination. These two 
criteria – that of equal influence that is individualized, unconditional and 
efficacious, and that of equal control capable of ensuring the equal 
acceptability of collective policies (p. 153) – are better candidates for the 
two complementary ideas of republicanism that flow from the central 
idea of non-domination. Moreover, popular sovereignty and equal 
participation in what Pettit has elsewhere called ‘authorial’ democracy 
have a natural affinity with these ideas.2 Certain sorts of mixture and 
contestation may be required in given circumstances to supplement or 
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modify the operation of these authorial mechanisms so as to realize the 
two normative criteria. However, these criteria also set limits to the ways 
and extent such supplementing can go and those limits turn out to be 
when they subvert popular sovereignty and equal participation. Put 
another way, the two republican traditions complement rather than being 
in conflict with each other, with the neo-Rousseauvian the primary and 
the neo-Italian-Atlantic secondary. Indeed, to some degree Pettit’s own 
presentation of his thesis follows this logic. 
What follows proceeds in three steps. First, I shall briefly show 
how the idea of a social contract can be shown to model a conception of 
non-domination that has a social and political system based on equal 
influence and control at its heart. Second, I shall suggest that popular 
sovereignty and equal participation offer straightforward ways of 
fulfilling these criteria. Finally, I shall suggest that while certain forms of 
mix and contestation are compatible with these two Rousseauvian 
mechanisms, the latter constrain how far either of the former can be taken 
and still meet the normative criteria of equal influence and control. 
A social contract offers a way of modelling what collective policies 
might be agreed in circumstances in which the parties to the contract 
possess equal influence and control over the relevant decisions and are 
equally subject to them. Note that it is not enough that the parties possess 
equality of input, it is as important that the outputs of any decision 
making process fall equally on them in a substantive as well as a purely 
formal sense. In other words, they need to have a roughly equal stake in 
the totality of collective policies and perceive them as forming a common 
good. Only then will they be motivated to pursue equitable policies. As 
Albert Weale has recently noted, a republican social contract can be 
compared in this respect to common property resource regimes that have 
been formed amongst roughly equally placed individuals in order to 
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secure a common good – such as wood from a local forest  - to their 
mutual advantage.3  
The notion of sovereignty comes in here. If the terms of the social 
contract are to be met within a political system, then citizens need to 
regard themselves as making policies for the collectivity and not just for 
themselves. Hence the need for the individual parties to the contract to 
incorporate themselves into the body politic. Such reasoning lies behind 
Rousseau’s arguments linking the popular sovereignty of an incorporated 
citizenry with the general will and majority rule. The legitimacy of the 
general will and its link to majority rule rest on citizens seeking to 
identify policies that are to the advantage of everyone, taken as a 
collectivity, rather than of each person taken individually. For example, a 
policy such as London’s Congestion Charge may be deemed beneficial to 
most Londoners, including London drivers, taken as a whole, but not to 
each and every individual driver taken in isolation. To identify such 
collective policies you need both to ensure all voices get an equal 
hearing, so that those who shout the loudest do not make policy, and to 
encourage each decision-maker to give equal consideration to these 
different voices when deciding what might be a good policy for the group 
as a whole. Therein lies the difference between ‘the general will’ and the 
‘will of all’. Only majority decision-making that has this dual aspect of 
encouraging equal inputs, on the one side, and placing them into mutual 
dialogue, on the other, will have the desirable qualities that Rousseau 
associated with the general will.4  
Decisions possessing these qualities will not only accord different 
views equal respect, they will also show them equal concern. However, 
Rousseau’s contention is that they will only manifest the latter feature to 
the extent citizens act as, and within the context of, a single sovereign 
body. By contrast, the former feature depends on citizens being equal and 
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active participants in decision-making. Rousseau was every bit as anxious 
as Pettit that not only should the determinations of the people give a 
direction to government policy, they should also be unconditioned by the 
executive and administration or any other persons or bodies external to 
the popular deliberative process. Yet, notoriously he felt that this goal 
required the rejection – or at least a strong suspicion of – representative 
government. In other words, it was essential to his argument that the 
direction for policy came directly from the people themselves and that 
they played an active role along with their fellow citizens in its positive 
articulation. Moreover, citizens could only be expected to modify their 
self-interest to conform to the common interest to the extent that they 
were directly engaged in deliberating with others. 
Of course, Rousseau’s arguments are fraught with ambiguities and 
obscurities that have given rise to contested interpretations. As I noted 
above, my purpose is not to expound let alone defend Rousseau per se so 
much as to put a case for the two elements of the neo-Rousseauvian 
position Pettit explicitly renounces – namely, popular sovereignty and 
equal participation. Just as he offers novel ways of developing the Italian-
Atlantic traditions recommendations regarding the mixed constitution and 
contestation, including dropping elements that seemed crucial to earlier 
thinkers but seem less so to us (one will look in vain, for example, for any 
discussion of a citizen militia), so I would want to suggest that a similar 
licence can be granted to developing the Rousseauvian argument. In 
particular, Rousseau’s strictures against representative government might 
be dropped to the extent the involvement of citizens in electing 
representatives to a sovereign legislature can be shown to capture the 
logic of his arguments regarding both sovereignty and participation 
without the drawbacks of direct democracy within a plenary assembly 
noted by Pettit. The crux here is whether emphasising these two elements 
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is incompatible with giving either a space or role to any form of 
contestation, as Pettit avows (pp. 14-15). 
The neo-Rousseauvian aims at establishing a form of decision-
making that comes from all and applies to all in ways that allows 
common interests to emerge that are informed by, but not just the sum of, 
particular interests. Pettit grants that his own arguments have a number of 
family resemblances to this project. In a similar way, he sees the aim of a 
democratic system as being to obtain ‘equally accessible influence in the 
imposition of an equally acceptable direction’ to public policy (p. 207). 
He also starts out by endorsing the ‘common sense’ opinion that equal 
participation in elections provides a key mechanism for meeting these 
conditions (p. 207). Moreover, he suggests that is most likely to happen 
in conditions that can be aligned with neo-Rousseauvian reasoning. For 
example, he favours a responsive over an indicative form of 
representation, and a representative assembly over an assembly of 
representatives on the grounds that the resulting legislature can thereby 
take ‘the form of a corporate agent that primarily tracks the electorate in 
the decisions it takes as a body.’ As a result, ‘the aggregate decisions of 
its membership are responsive to the dispositions in the electorate as a 
whole’ (Pettit 2012: 205-6). In other words, equal participation is most 
likely to generate a will that meets the criteria of equal acceptability in 
circumstances where the particular preferences of citizens get fairly 
balanced against and related to those of other citizens in the context of 
framing policies for the collectivity. A responsive electoral system based 
on majority rule that feeds into a representative assembly achieves this 
goal indirectly by giving representatives incentives to appeal to broad 
coalitions of citizens on the basis of a wide-ranging legislative 
programme in order to form a government.  
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However, although Pettit accepts that ‘electoral institutions’ form a 
‘centrepiece of any democratic system’ (p. 207), he contends they are not 
strictly necessary to it if other ways can be shown to be more effective in 
giving citizens an appropriate form of equal influence and control over 
government policy. He identifies a number of potential problems with 
electoral mechanisms in this respect for which contestatory mechanisms 
offer an appropriate response (pp. 209-38). These problems boil down to 
three: elections may register either false negatives or false positives; the 
degree of control and influence they offer may be conditioned by the 
government’s capacity to evade, resist or manipulate it; and government’s 
may be subject to other channels of influence and control beyond those 
stemming from the electorate.  
The first issue results from possible defects in the electoral process 
itself. Discreet and isolated minorities may have less than equal 
bargaining power because they can simply be ignored, yielding false 
negatives and raising the spectre of the tyranny of the majority. By 
contrast, other minorities may have more than equal bargaining power, 
perhaps as crucial partners in securing a majority, thereby producing false 
positives and the under acknowledged democratic problem of the tyranny 
of pivotal and powerful minorities. The second and third issues stem from 
the circumvention of the electoral process or its subversion from the 
outside. For example, executives possess an agenda setting power that 
can limit their responsiveness to the electorate. Additionally, they often 
have considerable discretion when reaching agreements at the 
international level. However, in doing so they may themselves feel their 
bargaining power is conditioned by the preferences of powerful business 
and financial interests or foreign governments. As Peter Mair noted, 
governments increasingly feel constrained by various unaccountable 
economic interests and institutions to act in ways they deem ‘responsible’ 
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even when that involves ceasing to be ‘responsive’ to the preferences and 
concerns of voters.5   
In both sets of cases, Pettit suggests that contestation offers a 
solution. Individuals need some alternative forum whereby they can 
reassert their influence and control by appealing to the norms of equality 
that underlie the democratic process itself. However, he argues the space 
for contestation is only possible in the context of a form of mixed 
constitution that even a neo-Rousseauvian would regard as both a 
confused and illegitimate undermining of sovereignty. The confusion 
arises from the way the mixed constitution multiplies the loci of decision-
making, raising the concern that decision-making will either be 
incoherent if different bodies make decisions in different areas of policy, 
or become dead-locked if a decision can only arise through their concord 
or agreement. The illegitimacy of contestation stems from the suggestion 
that individuals can withdraw from the political process and claim a right 
against it. Rousseau, following Hobbes, suggests that we would then end 
up either with an infinite regress or anarchy, for ‘if individuals were left 
some rights … there would be no common power who might adjudicate 
between them and the public’ (cited Pettit 2012, pp. 13, 229). 
Pettit suggests that in adopting the objections of Hobbes (and 
Bodin) to these traditional republican forms, Rousseau is betraying 
republicanism. However, the underlying worry is very much a republican 
one, that of factionalism. Although the contestation allowed by a mixed 
constitution may offer a response to the three problems mentioned above, 
it can also itself be a source of them. Any mechanism will prove easier 
for some groups to use rather than others. Voting in free and fair elections 
may have its limitations but has the advantage of being relatively costless 
for the voter. Most forms of contestation require more in the way of 
direct organisation and effort by citizens themselves. As such, they 
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favour those who can be easily organised and have the time and resources 
to do so, and who have clear and effective forms of protest available to 
them. A strike by air traffic controllers will be easier to organise and have 
a far greater impact than, say, action by the disadvantaged protesting 
against their poverty or unemployment. A dispersed group with little 
bargaining power may form an even more discreet and isolated minority 
when it comes to contestation than they do in elections, where parties 
have incentives to recruit their votes. As a result, contestation may itself 
give rise to false negatives and false positives. Likewise, contestation by 
powerful groups may be a factor in conditioning government 
responsiveness. For example, powerful private interests may threaten to 
contest public interest legislation through the courts as a way of winning 
concessions. If the worry with electoral mechanisms is that a concern for 
the general interest may fail to give due weight to the particular interests 
of certain individuals or groups, then the problem with contestatory 
mechanisms is that the empowerment of particular interests may subvert 
the general interest. The mixed constitution has a way of multiplying veto 
points, benefitting vested interests with most to lose from any change in 
the status quo. Instead of motivating the search for public policies that 
meet Pettit’s equal acceptability criteria, contestation risks only allowing 
those policies that each accept. 
The above might be thought to suggest that what is needed is a 
balance between electoral and contestatory mechanisms that would itself 
favour some form of mixed constitution, so that the critique of the neo-
Rousseauvian insistence on the sovereignty of a single collective 
decision-making body stands, even if electoral mechanisms get a more 
prominent role than Pettit gives them. In assessing this contention it is 
helpful to distinguish constitutional forms that separate power in various 
ways, on the one hand, from those that balance power, on the other, while 
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noting that only certain kinds of both need involve sharing power. As 
Pettit notes (p. 221), the problem lies with sharing whereas there are 
versions of separation and balance that remain compatible with  - and 
possibly even require - the final decision resting with a single body. For 
example, separating the political sphere from the influence of powerful 
private companies through such measures as limitations on campaign 
finance is entirely in line with neo-Rousseauvian prescriptions, although 
in enhancing the equity of the electoral process it arguably limits the 
scope for contestation – albeit, pace the Supreme Court in Buckley, 
legitimately so. Likewise, the devolution of the power to decide certain 
issues to discreet territorial subunits simply makes those bodies sovereign 
within these domains. Though Pettit says comparatively little about the 
mechanics of electoral, parliamentary systems, perhaps the most 
important form of balance in working democracies is between 
government and opposition parties both at elections and within the 
legislature. This balance combines electoral and contestatory mechanisms 
in a powerful way, giving politicians a continual incentive to ‘hear the 
other side’. Again, it can operate very effectively in single chamber 
democracies such as the Nordic countries. There, as elsewhere, it often 
involves a form of sharing power that is again compatible with a 
sovereign decision-making chamber: namely, coalition government. 
Though coalitions are often criticised for distorting the electoral process 
and can give undue weight to minority views, they can also serve to 
enhance equal influence and control and offer incentives to seek policies 
that are equally acceptable. 
Contemporary understandings of constitutionalism tend to 
downplay or even ignore these forms of separating and balancing power 
in which contestatory and electoral democracy go hand in hand, and 
which played a strong role in earlier constitutional thinking, and 
 11 
concentrate instead on those mechanisms that place them at logger-heads. 
Rights based constitutional judicial review is the most well known 
example. Yet, when it involves a strike down power, then arguably it 
generates precisely the problems that Rousseau worried about. On the one 
hand, it raises the problem of who is to judge between two bodies, the 
Court and the legislature, each of which may have conscientiously 
considered the rights at issue. If the Court has a strike down power, then 
sovereignty has effectively passed to a body with minimal democratic 
credentials. On the other hand, in claiming a right to counter the 
considered view of rights offered by the representatives of fellow 
citizens, the individuals or groups making such claims put themselves 
outside the political process and the search for a collective view of rights 
on an equitable basis with others.6 A standard way of attempting to meet 
this critique is to argue that a constitution represents the will of the 
constitutive if not the constituted people. In its standard form, that 
suggests  - in ways Pettit criticises – that the original consent of the 
people trumps their on-going control. It also begs the issue of whether 
Courts are truly bound by that consent rather than simply deciding 
uninfluenced and uncontrolled by either people or their law. Of course, 
that does not deny that Courts can have an important role to play in 
highlighting inconsistencies in legislation and unforeseen anomalies and 
injustices in their application to particular cases. Yet, as in Westminster 
and Nordic political systems, that fire alarm role only requires ‘weak’ 
rather than ‘strong’ judicial review, of a kind consistent with the 
legislature remaining sovereign.7 
Similar considerations arise with a second chamber. If these are 
seen not as legislative so much as review and scrutiny bodies, then that 
need not involve two chambers sharing in the legislative process in ways 
that deny the sovereignty of one of them ultimately to decide. Indeed, a 
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second chamber’s scrutiny role may be best served through its members 
being separated from participation in the executive or from proposing 
legislative measures of their own, so as to guarantee their independence 
from government or governmental and legislative ambitions proper.8 By 
contrast, bicameral legislatures that require concord between two sets of 
elected bodies, each of which has pretensions to govern, can create a joint 
decision trap, as Fritz Scharpf memorably put it, that increases 
transaction and policy costs as pork gets barrelled out to all the interests 
looking to be bought off.9 
The mixed constitution originated in class divided societies, its aim 
being to prevent the majority, as the popular element was known, from 
over-ruling the interests of the aristocracy or minority.10 Counter-
majoritarian devices risk continuing this historic role of upholding the 
interests of the privileged against the demands of the underprivileged into 
the democratic era. Pettit takes MacDonagh’s classic studies of the 
British nineteenth century revolution in government as illustrating the 
power of a process of democratisation to harness an evolving 
understanding of general public norms to promote social equality (pp. 
270-72). Yet it is notable that during precisely this same period many of 
the measures he records – such as the lowering of working hours and the 
abolition of child labour – were, along, of course, with the even worse 
evil of slavery – actively blocked by the ultra contestatory Italian-Atlantic 
system of the United States.11 The changes charted by MacDonagh were 
effected by the responsiveness of a representative assembly to the general 
will of the majority.  
It might be countered that the anti-slavery and civil rights 
movements in the US, along with the woman’s movement and the 
development of organised labour in the UK, support Pettit’s contention 
that we should prioritise the constitutive over the constituted people as 
 13 
the source of popular sovereignty, and that people’s control over 
government rests on their being ever ready to resist and reconfigure the 
established order. This interpretation makes the willingness to contest – 
what Adam Ferguson called the ‘refractory and turbulent zeal’ of the 
people  - the ultimate source of their liberty (cited p. 173). Pettit also 
presents this argument as an anti-Rousseauvian point, since Rousseau 
held that moving outside the constituted order entailed returning to the 
state of nature. Yet, Rousseau’s point was that republican liberty is a 
civic achievement – it is not what Pettit once refereed to as the natural 
liberty of the heath but achieved within the city.12 As such, it requires that 
a people remain sufficiently constituted that they see themselves as a 
people, possessing the tools – that only political society can offer – of on-
going, collective control. In conceiving such control as politically 
constituted through the practices of democracy rather than a pre-political 
legal constraint on governments, the neo-Rousseauvian can see the 
constituted people as being at the same time involved in a process of 
continuous self-constitution. Again, the achievement of nineteenth 
century Britain relative to either continental Europe or the United States 
is instructive. It showed how ‘the refractory and turbulent zeal of this 
fortunate people’ required neither revolution nor war to obtain the 
necessary reforms, whereas in the United States the constitutive people 
were constantly appealed to as a block on the majority will of the 
constituted people. 
To conclude, I have argued that the Rousseau-Continental tradition 
of republicanism can accommodate more of the Italian-Atlantic tradition 
than Pettit allows. Indeed, to a degree the one needs the other – they 
complement each other. Yet, this complementarity takes place within the 
confines of a broad neo-Rousseauvian concern with sovereignty and 
participation and the link between the collective deliberation of a 
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constituted people with an equitable concern with the common good. 
Contestation plays an important part in any democratic system of equal 
influence and control. However, contestation can only avoid creating the 
very distortions it seeks to mitigate when it offers a supplement to, rather 
than a substitute for, electoral mechanisms designed to reflect the 
majority will of the people.  
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